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AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY THE ARTICLE V
CONVENTION METHOD
Doi !GLAS G. VOEGLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article V of the United States Constitution reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which in either case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Con-
stitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight-hundred and eight shall in any Man-
ner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section
of the First Article; and that no State, without its Con-
sent, shall be deprived of its equal Sufferage in the
Senate. 1
Two methods of amending the Constitution are provided for in this
Article. Under one method, the amendment is initiated by
Congress. Under the alternative method, Congress, after being
petitioned by the states, calls a convention to propose amendments.
Since our Constitution was adopted in 1787, it has been amended
only twenty-six times. If the first ten amendments, the Bill of
*B. A., University of Nebraska, 1973;J. D., University of Nebraska - Lincoln School of Law,
1976; former law clerk, Honorable Paul W. White, Chief Justice, Nebraska Supremelcourt.
1. U. S. CONST. art. V.
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Rights, (which were adopted almost simultaneously with the adop-
tion of the Constitution, and can therefore be considered a part of
the original document) are excluded from this count, the Con-
stitution has been amended a mere sixteen times in nearly two hun-
dred years.
To date, all of the amendments to the Constitution have been
proposed by Congress. There has never been a constitutional con-
vention, "despite the fact that in the years since the Constitution
was ratified . . . [several hundred] resolutions have been submitted
to Congress by the States calling for national constitutional con-
ventions. "2
The Article V convention method has been called a "con-
stitutional curiosity," 3 the forgotten part of the article, 4 and "[olne
of the best-known 'dead letter' clauses in the federal Con-
stitution. ''5
While there has never been a constitutional convention, the
Article V provision has not been without effect in our nation's
history. 6 During the ratification of the Constitution, the Anti-
Federalists expressed concern that the Constitution did not contain
any provisions for the protection of certain basic rights of mankind.
Virginia and New York petitioned Congress to call a convention to
deal with this perceived defect. This led to Congress' proposing, in
1789, the Bill of Rights to quell these concerns. 7 At the turn of the
century, public agitation grew for an amendment to the Con-
stitution for the direct election of Senators. On several oecasions
between 1893 and 1902, the House of Representatives hadpassed
resolutions calling for such an amendment. The Senate, naturally
reluctant to propose an amendment which would place in jeopardy
the tenure of its current members, refused to act. After a significant
number of states petitioned Congress for a constitutional con-
vention to deal with the problem, Congress, afraid of the peoples'
2. Comnent. Amendment br Convention. Our Next Constitutional Crisis?. 53 N'C.L. REV. 491 (1975)
Ihcreinatter cited as Comment].
For a comprchensive list and analysis of the state resolutions calling for a constitutional
conv ention see American Bar Association Special Constitutional Convention Study Committee.
Atendment of the Constitution Br the Convention .1ethod Under Article V App. B. at 59-77 (1974)
Icreinafie r cited as A. B.A. Studv.
3. Comment. supra note 2. :it 492.
4. Dirksen. lhe Supreme Court and the Prople. 66 NlcH. I.. R v\'. 837 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Dirkse n.
5. Dixon. Article I." Thr Comatose Artich" of Our Living Constitution'. 66 MICH. L. RE\ . 931. 943
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
6. (oment. supra note 2. at 499.
7. Se A. B.A. Study. supra note 2. at 69-70.
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reaction should such a convention come into being, proposed the
seventeenth amendment providing for the direct election of
Senators .
8
In recent times, a significant attempt was made to invoke an
Article V convention to reverse the Supreme Court decisions of
Baker v. Carr,9 and Reynolds v. Sims, ° concerning state l'egislative
reapport ionment. The Council of State Governments and the late
Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois led an attempt to amend the
Constitution to permit one house of a state legislature to be exempt
from the "one man, one vote" rule."t After the Congressional
route failed, the Article V convention method was pursued. By
March 1967, "thirty-two states had submitted arguably valid ap-
plications to Congress - only two shy of the magic number
representing two-thirds of the States."' 2 On March 18, 1967, a
New York Times' story caught the nation off guard, with these com-
ments:
"(A) campaign for a Constitutional convention to modify the
Supreme Court's 'one man-one vote' rule is nearing success. It
would be the first such Convention since the Constitution was
drafted in Philadelphia in 1787.'13
While this attempt to call a constitutional convention did not
succeed, it did serve to stimulate a great deal of scholarly and
Congressional debate over the Article V convention method. As a
direct result, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina
introduced comprehensive legislation to deal with the Article V
convention method on August 17, 1967.14 Senator Ervin's
8. "The history of the 17th amendment illustrates the usefulness of having a method by which
a recalcitrant Congress can be bypassed when it stands in the way of the desires of the country for
constitutional change." S. REp. No. 93-293, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED
STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH AODITIONAL VIEws To ACCOMPANY S. 1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 93-293]. Seealso A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 72.
9. 369U. S. 186(196i).
10. 377 U. S. 533 (1964).
11. See Dirksen, supra note 4.
12. Comment, supra note 2, at 502.
13. New York Times, March 18, 1967 (city ed.) at 1, col. 6.
14. The legislation was first introduced as S.'2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Hearings were
held on the bill. Hearings on S. 2307 Before the Sub-Committee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee
on the.judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S, 2307]. Thereafter the
bill was revised and reintroduced. S. 623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Subcommittee reported
S. 623 to .the full Committee on the Judiciary but no action was taken during the 91st Cong. The
legislation was reintroduced in the 92d Cong., as S. 215. The Subcommittee reported the bill to the
full Committee which reported the bill to the Senate on July 20, 1971. With one amendment the bill
passed by a vote of 84-0. The bill was then referred to the House Judiciary Committee: No action
was taken on the bill by the House during the 92d Cong. The legislation was reintroduced in the 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. as S. 1272, which was identical to S. 215. The Subcommittee reported the bill to the
Committee which reported the bill favorably to the full Senate. See S. REp. No. 93-293, supra note 7.
The bill was again passed by the Senate, and again referred to the House Judiciary Committee.
Again, no further action was taken. During the 94th Congress the "Ervin" legislation was
introduced as S. 1815 by Senator Abourezk. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee. No action was taken. During the 95th Congress, the "Ervin" legislation was introduced
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legislation was the first comprehensive attempt by Congress to deal
with the Article V convention method, though it had previously
touched upon the problem. 15 Senator Ervin's efforts received much
attention and stimulated long-needed discussion. 16 Senator Ervin
gave these reasons for introducing the legislation:
The scant information and considerable misinformation
and even outright ignorance displayed on the subject of
constitutional amendment, both within the Congress and
outside it - and particularly the dangerous precedents
threatened by acceptance of some of the constitutional
misconceptions put forth - prompted me to introduce in
the Senate a legislative proposal designed to implement
the convention amendment provision in article V. 17
Congress to *date, however, has refused to take action on
comprehensive legislation dealing with the Article V convention
method. 18
It has been observed that "the primary importance of Article
V may be found in the in terrorem effect of an ultimate appeal to the
people for the correction of the abuses of their government."' 19 In
the past, states applied to Congress for a constitutional convention
because they thought such a convention would be desirable.
However, "[b]eginning with the twentieth century .. .the process
has been used primarily as a prod in the side of Congress to force
that body to propose a specific amendment. "20 Currently there are
as H.R. 7008 by Congressman Hyde, and as S. 1880 by Senator Helms. H.R. 7008 was referred to
the House Judiciary Committee which referred it to its Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights. S. 1880 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. No action was taken on either bill.
Because Senator Ervin was the first to consider this issue and draft legislation and because
subsequent Congressional legislation has been substantially identical to Senator Ervin's, this article
will cite Senator Ervin's legislation, S. 1272, as exemplifying the Congressional approach.
15. See, e.g., Hearings on Amending the Constitution Relative to Taxes on Income, Inheritance, and Gifts
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on S. J.
Res. 23 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); STAFF
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STATE APPLICATIONS ASKING
CONGRESS TO CALL A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (Comm. Print 1959); STAFF OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 82d CONG., 2d SEss., PROBLEMS RELATING TO STATE APPLICATIONS
FOR A CONVENTION TO PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAl TAX RATES (Comm. Print
1952).
16. See, e.g., Black, A mending The Constitution: A Letter To a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Black]; Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United
States Constitution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1612 (1972).
17. Ervin, Proposed Legislation To Implement The Convention Method of A mending The Constitution, 66
MICH L. REV. 875 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ervin].
16. See also H. Con. Res. 340, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H. Con. Res. 28, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
19.Kurland, Article Vand the Amending Process, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 148, 152. (D. Boorstin
ed. 1966).
20. Comment, supra note 2, at 500, citing, W. Pullen, The Application Clause of the Amending
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attempts to have an Article V convention call on the issues of forced
school busing,2 1 abortion, 22 and a balanced federal budget.
2 3
Even though there has never yet been an Article V
convention, the possibility of one being convened is not so remote
that the issues raised by the convention method should be ignored.
The attempt to call a constitutional convention to deal with
reapportionment of state legislatures came very close to success. As
long as the states use the convention method to prod Congress, the
prospect exists that someday a convention may be brought into
being.
It further seems that the convention method is well suited to
highly controversial and emotional issues. The congressional
method of amending the Constitution depends upon the actions of
the Members of Congress. In all practicality there is little effective
recourse which can be taken by a dissatisfied group against a
Congressman who votes against its proposed Constitutional
amendment. They could only work for his defeat in the next
general election, where his vote on the amendment would be just
one of many which the voters would have to decide upon. Also,
proposed amendments are often killed in committees, thereby
giving all but a few Members the opportunity of avoiding
responsibility for the fate of the amendment. A citizen or group,
however, has much greater impact with members of a state
legislature, where a single vote on one issue can be very important.
It thus seems likely that those favoring constitutional amendments
dealing with emotional and controversial issues will increase use of
the Article V convention method.
The purpose of this article is to explore the issues raised by the
Article V convention method.
II. THE GENESIS OF ARTICLE V AND THE
CONVENTION METHOD
As has been observed, "[t]he idea of amending the organic
instrument of a state is peculiarly American. "24 Prior to adoption
Provision of the Constitution 105 (1951) (unpublished thesis in Wilson Library, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill) [hereinafter cited as W. Pullen].
21. Comment, supra note 2, at 503 n.6
4
.
22. As of August 3, 1978, 13 states had petitioned Congress for a constitutional convention on
the subject of a pro-life amendment to the Constitution. Interview with Edward Zorinsky, U. S.
Senator (Aug. 3, 1978).
23. As of August 3, 1978, 23 states had filed petitions with Congress calling for a convention to
produce an amendment which would require a balanced federal budget. Interview with Edward
Zorinsky, U. S. Senator (Aug. 3, 1978).
24 . CRFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1 (1942) [hereinafter cited as L.
ORFIELO1.
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of the Constitution, several states had provisions for amending
their constitutions. Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation
provided for such amendment in the following manner:
And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably
observed by every state, and the union shall be perpetual;
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in
any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a
Congress of the United States and be afterwards
confirmed by the legislatures of every state.
25
The unanimous consent requirement created many difficulties for
the united colonies after the Revolution. 26 As Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina observed, "it is to this unanimous consent, the
depressed situation of the Union is undoubtedly owing. ",27
On February 21, 1787, Congress passed a resolution calling a
convention,
for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles
of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the
several legislatures such alterations and provisions
therein as shall, when agreed in Congress, and confirmed
by the states, render the federal Constitution adequate to
the exigencies of government and the preservation of the
Union.
28
It was inevitable that this convention would consider a provision
permitting admendments with the consent of less than the whole
number of states.
2 9
In May, 1787, the convention convened at Philadelphia.
Several plans of proposed government, which contained provisions
for amendment, were presented during the convention.30 Of the
25. Martig, Amending the Constitution. Article Five. The Kevstone of the Arch, 35 MICH! L. REV. 1253,
1255 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Martig[. citing. DocutIFNTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc.. No. 398. 69th Cong., 1 st Sess. 35 (1927).
26. For a review of the events leading up to the 1787 convention. see, e.g., M. FARRAND, THE
FRAMINC OF TIE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1962): Martig. supra note 25, at 1253-61.
27. 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 120 (1937) thereinafter cited as
M. FARRAND].
28. 1 J. ELLIOT, THE DFBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 120 (2d ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as J. ELLIOT].
29. Scheips, The Significance and Adoption of A rticle V of the Constitution, 26 NOTRE DAME LAw 46, 48
(1950).
30. On May 29, Edmund Randolph of Virginia introduced his plan (The Virginia Plan). On
the same date, after Randolph had introduced his plan, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
introduced his plan, Article 16, which provided as follows:
If Two Thirds ofthe Legislatures of the States apply for the same The Legislature
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various plans presented, the resolutions of Edmund Randolph of
Virginia are the most important, 31 and are the proper place to
begin an inquiry into the genesis of the Article V convention
method. Resolution 13 of the Randolph Resolutions (the Virginia
Plan) provided as follows: "Resd. that provision ought to be made
for the amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall
seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature
ought not to be required thereto. ",32
Resolution 13 was discussed onJune 11 th, with the convention
resolved into a Committee of the Whole House. Several members
did not see the necessity of the resolution at all, nor the propriety of
making the consent of the national legislature unnecessary. 33
Colonel George Mason of Virginia argued in favor of the necessity
of such a provision by stating the following:
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as
the Confederation has been found on trial to be.
Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be
better to provide for them, in an easy, regular, and
Constitutional way than to trust them to chance and
violence. It would be improper to require the consent of
the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their
power, and refuse their consent on that very account. The
opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of the
Constitution calling for amendment.
34
Randolph supported Mason's arguments. 35 However, the latter
of the United States shall call a convention for the purpose of amending the
Constitution - or should Congress with the Consent of Two Thirds of each house
propose to the States amendments to the same - the agreement of Two Thirds of the
Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments Parts of the
Constitution.
The Ratifications of the Conventions of -__ States shall be sufficient for
organizing this Constitution.
1. M. FARRAND, supra note 27 at 23;3 M. FARRAND, supra app. D, at 601.
On June 15, William Patterson of New Jersey introduced nine resolutions (The New Jersey
Plan). Resolution 2 of the plan provided that "in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in
Congress, by the present existing article of Confederation, they he authorized ... to alter and amend
in such manner as they shall think proper..." 1 M. FARRAND, supra at 243.
On June 18, Alexander Hamilton of New York read a sketch of a plan of government, which
was never formally placed before the convention. Article IX, Section 12 of Hamilton's plan provided
the following:
This Constitution may receive such alterations and amendments as may be
proposed by the Legislature of the United States, with the concurrence.of two thirds of
the members of both Houses, and ratified by the Legislatures of, or by Conventions of
deputies chosen by the people in, two-thirds of the States composing the Union. 3 M.
FARRAND, supra at 630.
31. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1962).
32. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 27, at 22.
33. Id. at 202.
34. Id. at 202-03 (Madison's notes).
35. Id. at 203.
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part of the resolution, providing that the consent of the national
legislature should not be required, was lost. 36 The remainder of the
resolution was accepted and referred to the Committee of Detail 7
wherein the provision for amending the Constitution was
discussed.
38
On August 6, the Committee of Detail presented the first draft
of the Constitution to the full convention. Article XIX of the draft
read as follows:
"On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
states in the Union, for an amendment, of this Constitution, the
Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that
purpose. 39
This draft was printed for the use of the convention delegates
and occupied their discussions for over a month. Article XIX of the
draft came up for discussion on August 30th. Gouverneur Morris
of Pennsylvania suggested that the Legislature should be left at
liberty to call a convention whenever they pleased. 40 Thereafter
the article was unanimously agreed to.
4'
On September 10th, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved
to reconsider Article XIX of the first draft on the grounds that since
the Constitution was to be paramount to the state constitutions,
two-thirds of the states could obtain a convention wherein a
majority could bind the union to innovations which might subvert
the state constitutions. 42 Alexander Hamilton of New York
seconded Gerry's motion to reconsider, citing the following
different reasons:
He (Hamilton) did not object to the consequences stated
by Mr. Gerry - There was no greater evil in subjecting
the people of the U.S. to the major voice than the people
of a particular State - It had been wished by many and
was much to have been desired that an easier mode for
introducing amendments had been provided by the
articles of Confederation. It was equally desirable now
that an easy mode should be established for supplying
defects which will probably appear in the new System.
The mode proposed was not adequate. The State
36. Id.
37. Id. at 237: 2 M. FARRAND, supra at 83.
38. Id. at 148. 152. 159. 174.
39. Id. at 188.
40. Id. at 468.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 557-58.
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Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view
to increase their own powers - The National Legislature
will be the first to perceive and will be the most sensible to
the necessity of amendments, and ought also to be
empowered, whenever two thirds of each branch should
concur to call a Convention - There could be no danger
in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in
the case.
43
James Madison of Virginia also favored the motion to reconsider,
perceiving the vagueness of the provision.
"Mr. Madison remarked on the vagueness of the terms 'call a
Convention for the purpose' as sufficient reason for reconsidering
the article. How was a Convention to be formed? By what rule De-
cide? What the force of its act?
' 44
The motion to reconsider was passed. 45 James Wilson of Penn-
sylvania and Roger Sherman of Connecticut then moved to
amend the proposed article.46 Consideration of this was postponed
upon a motion by Madison, who suggested the following provision
in place of what had previously been agreed to:
The Legislature of the U.S. - whenever two-thirds of
both Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application
of two-thirds of the Legislatures of the several States,
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as parts thereof,
when the same shall have been ratified by three-fourths at
least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three-fourths thereof, as one or the other
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature
of the U.S.
41
Madison's motion was seconded by Hamilton. John Rutledge of
South Carolina moved to amend Madison's proposal to protect
slavery interests. 48 His amendment was accepted by the con-
vention, and Madison's proposal, as amended, approved.49
Article XIX of the first draft of the Constitution was reported
43. Id. at 558 (Madison's notes).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 558-59.
47. Id. at 559.
48. Id.
49. Id,
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out of the Committee of Style and Revision as Article V of the
second draft of the Constitution. Article V then read as follows:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall
deem necessary, or on the application of two-thirds of the
legislatures of the several states, shall propose amend-
ments to this consitution, which shall be valid to all in-
tents and purposes, as part thereof, when the same shall
have been ratified by three-fourths at least of the
legislatures of the several states, or by conventions in
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by the Congress: provided,
that no amendment which may be made prior to the year
1808 shall in any manner affect the-___ and __ sections
of article 0
Article V came up for discussion on September 15. Sherman
expressed fears that three-fourths of the states might abolish par-
ticular states or deprive them of their equal representation in the
Senate, and felt that the Article V provision which prevented use of
the amendment power to affect slavery should be expanded to
provide that no State could be affected in its internal police power
or deprived of its equality in the Senate.' Mason thought that the
plan for amending the Constitution as proposed was exceptionable
and dangerous. He pointed out that as proposing amendments, un-
der both modes, depended either immediately or ultimately upon
the Congress, no amendments could ever be obtained by the people
should the government become oppressive, as he believed it
someday would. 52 Upon Mason's objections, Gouverneur Morris
and Eldbridge Gerry moved to amend the article so as to require a
Convention upon the application of two-thirds of the states.
5
1
Madison stated that he did not see why the Congress would not be
as much bound to propose amendments applied for by two-thirds of
the States as to call a convention on like application. He added,
however, that he saw no objection against providing for a Con-
50. Id. at 629. The blanks were filled in to read, "affect the first and fourth sections of Article
I.,,
51. Id.
52. Id. In the margin ofhis copy ofthe second draft (September 12) Mason wrote as follows:
Article 5th - By this article Congress only have the power of proposing
amendments at any future time to this constitution and should it prove ever so
oppressive, the whole people of America can't make, or even propose alterations to it;
a doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental rights and liberties of the people.
Id. n.8.
53. Id. at 629.
ARTICLE V
vention for the purpose of proposing amendments, except for the
difficulties which might arise as to the form, the quorum,, etc.,
which he thought in Constitutional regulations ought to be avoided
as much as possible. 54 The Morris and Gerry amendment was ac-
cepted. After further discussion, Article V was amended a final
time, to quell the fears raised by Sherman and the smaller states,
adding the proviso, "[tjhat no State, without its consent shall be
deprived of its equal sufferage in the Senate. ' ' 55 Article V thus
assumed its present form.
When the Constitution was before the various state con-
ventions for ratification, the amendment procedure in Article V ap-
pears generally to have been viewed positively, a reason for
ratification .56
James Madison, in The Federalist No. 43, made these ob-
servations regarding Article V:
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience,
could not but be foreseen. It was requisite therefore, that
a mode for introducing them should be provided. The
mode preferred by the Convention seems to be stamped
with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against
the, extreme facility which would render the Constitution
too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might per-
petuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables
that general and state governments to originate the
amendment of errors as they may be pointed out by
experience on one side or another.
57
Article V, like numerous other constitutional provisions, is a
result of compromise. The majority of convention members
recognized that the new Constitution should contain a method
whereby it could be altered or amended if such need should arise in
the future. One faction did not trust giving the states the amending
power for fear that they would use this power either to weaken the
strong national union being forged or to destroy and discriminate
54. Id. at 629-30.
55. Id. at 631.
56. Before North Carolina's ratifying convention James Iredell argued, "it is a most happy
circumstance, that there is a remedy in the system itself for its own fallibility, so that alterations can
without difficulty be made, agreeable to the general sense of the people." 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 28,
at 176-77.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Cooke ed. 1961).
Justice Story also spoke highly of the usefulness and propriety of the amending provision.
J. STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1827-28(5th ed.
1891 )[hereinafter cited as.l. STORY].
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against other states. The other faction did not trust the national
legislature with sole possession of the amending power, fearing that
if the government became oppressive, it would never permit a-
mendments to end the abuses.
The debates of 1787 make it clear that the convention method
of amending the Constitution was devised as a protection against
this latter concern. There was to be an amending process whereby
Congress would be bypassed, and the people could initiate amend-
ments, despite opposition from Congress. 58 When trying to resolve
the issues and questions raised by the Article V convention method,
this purpose must be clearly kept in mind.
III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE ARTICLE V CONVENTION
METHOD
Article V speaks in general terms. It neither describes nor
defines the convention which it contemplates. The debates of the
1787 convention are not very helpful in attempting to perceive the
constitutional shape of such a convention. It would appear initially
that an Article V convention must be some sort of deliberative
body.
59
Many questions have been raised concerning the Article V
convention method, some of which have been satisfactorily
resolved. Others continue to plague those concerned in this area.
This section of the article will discuss these questions.
A. CAN CONGRESS CALL A CONSTITITTIONAL CONVENTION
ABSENT STATE APPLICATIONS?
One question that has arisen is whether Congress on its own
initiative can call an Article V convention. It is generally agreed
that Congress does not have the power to do so. The argument
against Congress' power to do so, has been thusly stated:
Congress is neither authorized nor compelled to summon
an Article V convention prior to the submission by two-
thirds of the state legislatures of proper and timely ap-
plications for such a convention. The reasons for this are
58. Comment. supra note 2, at 498.
59. See Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Some Problems, 39
NOTRE DAME LAW, 659, 662 (1964): Platz, Article V of the Federal Constitution: 3 GFO. W'\rASH. L.
REV. 17, 45 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Platz].
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several. Since the United States is a government of
delegated powers, it possesses no authority except that
conferred upon it by the Constitution. Article V, the only
provision in the Constitution dealing with its amend-
ment, must therefore be deemed exhaustive and not
merely illustrative of the federal government's power in
this regard. That provision explicitly sets out two modes
for proposing constitutional amendments, only one of
which contemplates the convening of a convention em-
powered to propose amendments. Such a convention is
authorized by Article V only when two-thirds of the state
legislatures have made 'Applications' for a convention.
As a result, applications within the meaning of Article V
from two-thirds of the states legislatures must fairly be
deemed absolute prerequisites to the summoning of such
a body.
60
A contrary argument, however, has been advanced. 6'
Nothing in the 1787 convention debates supports the view that
Article V was merely meant to be illustrative of one method of con-
stitutional amendment, 62 and that Congress could therefore, in the
absence of state applications, call a convention.
63
B. Is CONGRESS OBLIGATED TO CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION WHEN PROPERLY PETITIONED?
It has been argued that the terms of Article V, providing that
Congress shall call a constitutional convention when petitioned, are
60. Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949, 951
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield]. Seealso L. ORFIELD, supra note 24, at 37, 40.
61. See Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE DAME
LAW 185, 196 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Corwin & Ramsey].
62. On August 30, Morris suggested that the national legislature should be at liberty to call a
convention whenever they pleased. Supra note 40 and accompanying text. On September 10,
Hamilton also suggested that the national legislature should be empowered to call a convention
absent state application. Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
These actions clearly would not support an argument that Article V is merely illustrative. At
the time these actions were taken, the only method contemplated by the convention for proposing
amendments was to call a convention for that purpose. Thus Morris and Hamilton were merely
stating their viewpoint that the national legislature should also be able to initiate amendments - not
conventions - without the need for state request, which ultimately it was given the power to do.
63. It could be argued that Congress does in fact have such a power. By accepting the liberal
interpretation that all applications from the States, regardless of their reasons, should be counted
together to meet the two-thirds requirement, and by accepting a lengthy period during which
applications would be counted, at almost any given point, Congress would have no difficulty in
finding the Article V prerequisites to a constitutional convention arguably met.
64. See, e.g., DoddJuicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of the Coistitution, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 54, 82
1931); Platz, supra note 59, at 44.
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not mandatory but merely permissive. 64 There has been strong ob-
jection to this viewpoint. 65 The evidence that Article V places a
mandatory duty upon Congress to call a convention, when properly
petitioned, is overwhelming.
The wording of Article V supports this argument. Article V
provides that "on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds
of the several States (Congress) shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments ".66 In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,67 the
Supreme Court interpreted the word "shall" as having a man-
datory effect in the contest of the Constitution.
68
It seems clear that the framers intended that Congress be sub-
jected to a mandatory duty to call a convention when properly
petitioned. 69 In The Federalist No. 85, Hamilton wrote:
In opposition to the probability of subsequent
amendments, it has been urged that- the persons delegated
to the administration of the national government will
always be disinclined to yield up any portions of the
authority of which they were once possessed. For my own
part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any
amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be
thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of
the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this
account alone I think there is little weight in the
observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in
it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of
governing thirteen states at any rate, independent of
calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the
national rules the necessity of a spirit of accommodation
to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. But
65. See Bonfield, supra note 60, at 976: Ervin, supra note 17, at 886.
66. U.S. CONST. art. V.
67. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
68. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 327 (1816).
69. In a letter on the subject. Madison observed that the question concerning the calling of a
Conventiont. 'will not belong to the Federal Legislature. If two-thirds of the states apply' for one,
Congress cannot refuse to call it: if not. the other mode of amendments must be pursued.'" Letter
from Madison to Mr. Eve, dated January 2. 1789, REPRINTED IN 5 U. S. BUREAU OF ROLLS &
LIBRARY. DOCNUENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1786-
1870 143.
One delegate to the North Carolina ratifying convention explained Article V as follows:
... that it is very evident that . . .[the proposal of amendments] does not depend on
the will of Congress: for. . the legislatures of two-thirds of the states were authorized
to make applications for calling a convention to propose amendments, and, on such
applications, it is provided that Congress shall call such convention, so that they will
have no option.
4.1. ELLIOT. supra note 28. at 178. See also Corwin & Ramsey. supra note 61. at 195.
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there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond
the possibility of doubt, that the observation' is futile. It is
this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur,
will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of
the plan, the Congress will be obligated 'on the
application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States
(which at present-amount to nine), to call a convention
for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all
intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or
by conventions in three fourths thereof.' The words of
this article are peremptory. The Congress 'shall call a
convention.' Nothing in this particular is left to the
discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the
declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes
in air. 70
Further, keeping in mind the purpose behind the Article V
convention method; i.e., insuring that the people would always
have at their disposal a method of correcting defects in the system
should the national government become oppressive and refuse to
initiate changes, it becomes apparent that the duty imposed upon
Congress must be mandatory. Were Congress to have discretion
over the calling of a convention, the purpose behind the provision
would be nullified.
C. STATE APPLICATIONS FOR A CONSTITI TIONAL CONVENTION
The duty of Congress to call a convention when properly
petitioned is mandatory. Congress, however, has the power to
ascertain whether the'prerequisites to this duty have been met. 7i
Article V states that Congress shall call a convention "on the Ap-
plications of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several states. "72
This provision raises several questions. How long should Congress
count state applications? Should only those applications which deal
with the same subject matter be counted together, or should all
states applications regardless of subject matter be included? May a
state rescind its application for a convention?
It is generally agreed that Congress should consider only those
applications which are submitted reasonably contemporaneously
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (Cooke ed. 1961).
71. Wheeler, Isa Constitutional Convention Impending, 21 ILL. L. REV. 782, 790 (1927)[hereinafter
cited as Wheeler],
72. U.S. CONST art. V.
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with one another when determining whether the prerequisites of its
Article V duty have been met.' 3 The framers intended that the
Constitution be modified only when there was significant
agreement among the states and the peopie to do so. 74 The framers
thus provided that Congress must call a convention only when two-
thirds of the states petitioned for one; that an amendment would
not be ratified unless three-fourths of the states agreed thereto; and
that two-thirds of both Houses of Congress must concur before the
amendment was initiated. The framers required significantly more
than mere majority agreement at all phases of the amending
process. The implicit requirement of substantial agreement, when
applied to the application process, calls for two-thirds of the states
to agree that the convention procedure be invoked. Inherent in the
concept of agreement is a contemporaneous convergence of desire
for a specified course of action.
The next issue then is what constitutes a contemporaneous
period during which to count applications? One writer has
suggested that applications tendered during one "generation" be
counted together. 75 Another suggests that Congress count only
those applications which it receives during one session. 76 The best
view appears to be that there be no definite period since what is
contemporaneous in each case will vary, depending on factors such
as the issues involved and the political climate. In Coleman v.
Miller,77 involving the validity of Kansas' ratification of the
proposed Child Labor Amendment, the Supreme Court held that
the validity of a state's ratification of a proposed amendment,
nearly thirteen years after it has been proposed, was
nonjusticiable. 78 The Court stated that the question of a reasonable
time for ratification involved considerations of political, social, and
economical conditions prevailing since the amendment was
submitted for ratification and that Congress, not the Court, was in
the best position to evaluate these. 79 Applying the same rationale to
applications, the converse side of the amending process, in
determining whether the prerequisites of its duty to call a
convention have been met, Congress would analyze the above
73. See Bonfield, supra note 60, at 958; Corwin & Ramsey, supra note 61, at 195-96.
74. Note, Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARV. L. RFv.
1067, 1071-72(1957).
75. L. ORFIELD, supra note 24, at 42.
76. Sprague, Shall WeHavea Federal Constitutional Convention, and WhatShall it Do?, 3 MF. L. RFv.
115, 123 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Sprague].
77. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
78. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
79. Id. at 453-54.
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mentioned factors and decide whether contemporaneous
agreement for a constitutional convention was present. 80
Congress may, if it so desired, choose to set a definite period
during which applications calling for a convention to deal with a
particular subject would be counted. In Dillon v. Gloss, "I the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of a definite period imposed by
Congress for state ratifications. The Court held:
We do not find anything in the Article [V] which suggests
that an amendment once proposed is to be open to
ratification for all time, or that ratification in some of the
States may be separated from that in others by many
years and yet be effective . . . First, proposal and
ratification are not treated as unrelated acts but as
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural
inference being that they are not to be widely separated in
time . . . . [A]s ratification is but the expression of the
approbation of the people and is to be effective when had
in three-fourths of the States, there is a fair implication
that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that
number of States to reflect the will of the people in all
sections at relatively the same period, which of course
ratification scattered through a long series of years would
not do. These considerations and the general purport and
spirit of the Article lead to the conclusion expressed by
Judge Jameson 'that an alteration of the Constitution
proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that
sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be
regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by Congress. 
82
Applying the rationale of Dillon to the application process,
Congress may impose a reasonable period during which state
applications would be considered together.83 Such a definite period
would have the advantage of removing the subjective
determinations previously mentioned, but would not unduly
burden the use of the convention method, as state legislatures could
80. See Bonfield, supra note 60, at 961.
81. 256 U.S. 368(1921).
82. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374-75(1921).
83. Accord, A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 31-32.
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periodically renew their applications, if they retained their interest
in calling a convention.
The Ervin legislation provides that an application submitted to
the Congress by a state shall remain effective for seven calendar
years after the date it is received by Congress.84 Presumably this
time period was suggested by analogy to the limitation period set
for ratifications.8 5 It has been suggested, however, that the
considerations pertinent to ratification are not the same for the
application process, and that four years might be a more
appropriate period. 
86
Another issue raised is whether only those applications which
deal with the same issue should be counted together, or whether all
state applications requesting a constitutional convention, regardless
of the reasons cited by the state in its application therefor, should be
included.
Initially, in order to be an "application" within the meaning
of Article V, a state's communication with Congress must
somewhere contain a request for a constitutional convention. 87 It
also appears that Congress may not require the state's application
to be in any particular form.
88
Article V seems to require a general consensus among two-
thirds of the states that a constitutional convention be called. Thus,
only those applications which request a convention to deal with the
same issue should be counted together. If one state, for example,
desires a constitutional convention to propose a pro-life
amendment, and another state desires a convention to propose an
amendment requiring a balanced federal budget, there is a general
consensus or agreement that a convention be called, but a basic
disagreement exists regarding what the convention should
consider. If two states, however, request a convention to consider a
balanced budget amendment, then the requisite agreement exists.
The Ervin legislation adopts this approach, counting together only
those applications which call for a constitutional convention to deal
with "the same subject.' 8 9
Another issue concerning state applications is whether a state
may rescind its application for a constitutional convention. The
Ervin legislation permits such recission up until the required
number of states have petitioned Congress for a convention.9" This
84. S. 1272. supra note 14, § 5(a).
85. See S. REP. No. 93-293. supra note 8. at 11.
86. Note. 85 HARV. L. REv'. supra note t6. at 1620-21: A.B.A. Study. supra note 2. at 32.
87. A.B.A. Study. supra note 2. at 30.
88. See Dirksen, supra note 4, at 864: S. Rpp. No. 93-293. supra note 8. at 10.
89. S. 1272. supra note 14. §§ 5(a). 6(b).
90. Id. § 5(b).
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is clearly the correct approach. State applications for a convention
should show a general consensus among the requisite number of
states that a constitutional convention be held. A state can hardly
be said to be part of a consensus to call a convention after it has
rescinded its application. After the requisite number of states have
petitioned Congress and invoked its duty to call a convention, a
state has other courses of action open to it should it, after
reconsidering, no longer desire the convention. Allowing a state to
rescind its application after the required number of states have
submitted applications and the duty to call the convention has
arisen would amount to giving a single state, or handful of states, a
veto power over the convention method after it has been set in
motion.
A final issue with state applications is the effect of calling a
constitutional convention upon previously submitted applications.
If one accepts the viewpoint that a duly convened constitutional
convention has the power to propose amendments on any subject,
it would appear that all previously submitted applications would
lose their validity once the convention is held, since each state
would have the right to seek adoption by the convention of
amendments on any subject. If the viewpoint is accepted that the
convention can be limited in scope to consideration of the topic
placed by Congress in the call, then only those state applications
dealing with that topic should lose their validity once the
convention is held.
D. THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATE GOVERNORS, AND THE
VICE-PRESIDENT IN THE ARTICLE V CONVENTION METHOD.
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution in part provides as
follows:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
-by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed
by two-thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules of Limitations
prescribed in the case of a Bill. 91
91.U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 7.
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The Supreme Court has held that provisions of the Constitution
must be read in light of each other. 92 Consequently, it has been
argued that the President has the power to veto Congress' call of a
constifutional convention. 93 It is pointed out that Congress must
enact legislation, pursuant to its call of the Convention, which is
similar to other types of legislation which Congress normally deals
with, and therefore, no logical reason exists to exclude the
convention process from the scope of Article I, Section 7.94 The
President, it is urged, would be under a duty to veto a call if he
believed the constitutional prerequisites were not met 95 or if he
believed that the convention was not in the nation's best interests.
96
This viewpoint is. clearly untenable. Despite the surface
similarity between legislation which Congress must enact
incidental to a convention call and other types of legislation over
which the President possesses the veto power, Congress, when
enacting legislation pursuant to the call of a constitutional
convention, is performing a unique function delegated to it by a
specific article of the Constitution. Congress is not acting in its
regular lawmaking role. Congress is merely the agency selected by
the framers through which this process is to be effectuated.
97
The history of Article V lends no support to the proposition
that the President has a role in the amendment by convention
process. Article V speaks only of Congress. No mention is made of
the President, nor can a role for him be inferred into the article
from its specific language or from the 1787 debates. 98 Were the
President given a veto power over the Article V convention method
a great obstacle would stand in the way of the people as they
attempt to amend the Constitution. The Article V convention
method was designed to insure the people a way to amend the
Constitution in the event the national government, presumably
including the President, should ever become oppressive. To include
92. Se Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp.. 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964): Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S.
537(1902).
93. Sec. e.,. Black. supra note 16. at 206-09.
94. Black. The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster. 72 YALE L. J., 957. 965
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Black]: Bonfield. supra note 60. at 986.
95. See. e.g.. Bontield. supra note 60. at 986.
96. Black supra note 94. at 965.
97.
Since Article V is a grant ofpower to Congress. and not to the Federal Government. as
wse has e seen. and since Congress is bound to call a convention upon the application of
the requisite number ofstates, it would seem that such act should not be subject to the
Prtesident's v'to.
Platz. supra note 59. at 37.
98. Sec Gilliam. Constitttional Conventions: Prcedentts, Problems. and Proposals. 16 ST. Louts U.L.J.
46. 48 (1971) [hereinafter cied as Gilliaml.
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the President in this process would be contrary to the intent of the
framers. Presumably, the act of calling a convention, and all
legislation incidental thereto, would require a mere majority vote of
both houses.9 9 If the President had the power to veto matters
relating to the call of such a convention, each house would be
required by Article I, Section 7 to repass the measures by a two-
thirds vote. This would greatly inhibit the effectiveness of the
convention method. 1
00
The first ten amendments were submitted to the states for
approval without having first been sent to President
Washington. 10 1 In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 102 the Supreme Court
considered a case involving the validity of the eleventh amendment.
It was argued that the amendment was void because it was not
proposed in the form prescribed by the Constitution, having never
been submitted to the President for his approval, as it was
contended was required under Article I, Section 7.103 Counsel
argued that the President's concurrence was required in matters of
infinitely less importance than amending the Constitution and that
the language of Article I, Section 7 applied equally, whether on
subjects of ordinary legislation or of constitutional amendment. 
104
Hollingsworth involved the congressional method of amending
whereby amendments are proposed by two-thirds of the members
of each house. Counsel stated as follows:
... .it is no answer to the objection, to observe, that as
two-thirds of both houses are required to originate the
proposition, it would be nugatory to return it with. the
president's negative, to be repassed by the same number;
since the reasons assigned for his disapprobation might be
so satisfactory as to reduce the majority below the
constitutional proposition. 
105
The Attorney General pointed out that the same course (not
requiring the approval of the President) had been followed in all the
other amendments which had been adopted. He argued that the
case of amendments is a substantive act, unconnected with the
99. Platz, supra note 59, at 37,
100. The A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, supports the opinion that the President has no role in the
amendment process. Id. at 26-28.
101. Annot., Article 1, Section 7, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1964 ed.).
102. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
103. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 378-79 (1798).
104. Id. at 379.
105. Id. at 378-79.
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ordinary business of legislation, and not within the policy or terms
investing the President with a qualified negative on acts and
resolutions of Congress. 0 6 In a footnote to the Attorney General's
argument, Justice Chase wrote, "[t]here can, surely, be no
necessity to answer that argument. The negative of the president
applies only to ordinary cases of legislation: he has nothing to do
with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the
constitution. ''107
In 1803, a motion to submit the twelfth amendment to the
President was defeated in the Senate. In 1861, a proposed
amendment on slavery was presented to and signed by President
Buchanan. In 1865, the proposed thirteenth amendment was
submitted to President Lincoln and signed by him, in apparent
inadvertence. This matter was discussed in the Senate and a
resolution was passed declaring that the President's signature was
unneccessary, that his actions were inconsistent with previous
practice and that this should not constitute a precedent for the
future. In 1866, President Andrew Johnson made clear, in a report
sent to Congress, that actions taken by the President relating to
amendments were ministerial in nature and did not commit the
President to a role in the process. Since that time, no proposed
amendment has been submitted to the President.' °8 Finally, in
Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 109 the Supreme Court, citing Hollingsworth,
stated unequivocably that, "[Alt an early day this court settled that
the submission of a constitutional amendment did not require the
action of the President. "110
While Hollingsworth dealt with the Congressional amendment
process, there is no reason to believe that had the question arisen in
connection with the Article V convention method that a different
result would have been reached. The Ervin legislation provides that
the convention shall be called by the passage of a concurrent
resolution which does not require the signature of the President. '
Another issue concerns the role of a state governor in the
Article V convention method. May the governor veto a state's
application to Congress for a constitutional convention? Article V
provides that, "[c]ongress . . . on the Application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a
106. Id. at 380,
107. Id.
108. A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 27.
109. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
110. Hawke v. Smith, No. 1,253 U.S. 221, 229(1920).
111. S. 1272, supra note 14, 5 6(a).
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convention for proposing Amendments .... ''112 The answer to the
question concerning the role of the state governor in this process
revolves around the meaning of the word "Legislatures" as used in
Article V.
The Supreme Court has held that the term "legislature" in a
particular clause of the Constitution depends upon the type of
activity that the legislature is called upon to perform. In Smiley v.
Holm,113 the Supreme Court held that when a state legislature
prescribes the time, place, and manner of holding elections under
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is enacting legislation and
in that context "legislature" means the entire legislative process of
the state, including the executive veto. As stated by the Court,
"[w]herever the term 'legislature' is used in the Constitution it is
necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in
view. ''114
In Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 15 the Supreme Court struck down a
provision in Ohio's constitution requiring ratification of proposed
constitutional amendments by popular referendum. The Court
found this to be invalid because Article V required ratification by
"legislatures" and that a popular referendum was not a
"legislature" within the sense the term was used in Article V. The
Court wrote as follows:
The only question really for determination is: What did
the framers of the Constitution mean in requiring
ratification by "Legislatures"? That was not a term of
uncertain meaning when incorporated into the
Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means
for the purpose of interpretation. A Legislature was then
the representative body which made the laws of the
people. "
6
Ratification of a proposed amendment, the Court stated, was not
an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word, but merely
an expression of assent for which no legislative action is authorized
or required. The Court further held that the power to ratify a
proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution had its source in
the Federal Constitution; and the act of ratification by a state
112. U.S. CONST. art. V.
113. 285 U.S. 355(1932).
114. Smiley v. Holm. 285 U.S. 355. 366(1932). See also Note, 70 HARV. L. Rev., supra note 74,
at 1074.
115. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
116. Id. at 227.
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derived its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the
state and its people had assented. 11
7
The term "legislatures" in Article V thus means the
representative body which ordinarily makes the laws. The function
given to this agency by Article V is a federal function derived from
the Constitution. Consequently, when state legislatures apply to
Congress for an Article V convention they are not acting as
lawmakers under their state constitutions but as federal agents
performing a federal function. They are representatives of the
people of the State under the power granted by Article V. The
article imports a function different from that of lawmakers and
renders inapplicable the conditions which usually attach to the
making of state laws, such as the governor's approval. 118 The
Ervin legislation follows this viewpoint by providing that a state's
application for a convention need not be approved by the state's
governor. 1 19
The final issue for discussion is whether the Vice-President has
a role in the Article V convention process. Article I, Section 3
provides that, "[t]he Vice-President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be
equally divided.'1 20 If the Senate is equally divided on the calling
of a constitutional convention, may the Vice-President cast his vote
to break the tie? As in the case of the President, Article V makes no
specific reference to the Vice-President, nor do the debates of 1787.
There exists, however, evidence that the framers did not intend for
the Vice-President to have a role in the amending process. 121
In applying the same reasoning to the Vice-President as
applies to the role of the President, it appears that the Vice-
President should likewise have no role in the amending process.
Just as the power of the President to veto legislation under Article I,
117. Atrord. leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130. 137 (1922). Ser also Petuskev v. Rampton. 307 F.
Supp. 235 (1969). ra,'d on other grounds, 431 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1970). arrt. denied, 401 U.S. 913
(1971).
118 C. BrIcKFIE.D, STAFF OF HotSF. COMM. ON TtHE JUDICIARN. 85"I't CONG., IST SESS.,
PRORI ';s REtLATING TO A FEDFrRsR CONSTITUTIONAI CONVFNTION 10-11 (Comm. Print 1957)
hereinItatr cited as C. BRIC-FIEt.D. SC(. State ux. Tel Sanstead v. Freed. 251.N.W.2d 898 (N.D.
1977) (lieutenant governor could not vote t pon final disposition of resolutions proposing
amendments to the U, S. Constitution): Opinion of thejustitcs to the Senate. 366 N.E'.2d 1226
(Mass. 1977) (signature o 'Governor not required on resolutions calling for a national convention).
119. S. 1272. supra note 14. 1§ 3(a): But see Black. supra note 16. at 209-10. where the author
argues that state governors should not be excluded from the armendlent by convention process of
Article V.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
121. In 1803. Pierce Butler, then Vice-President of the United States, who had been a delegate
from South Carolina to the 1787 Convention, stated on the floor of the Senate, "It was never
intended by the Constitution that the Vice-President. should have a vote in altering the
Constitution."
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 27, at 400.
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Section 7 applies only to ordinary legislation, so should the power
of the Vice-President to cast a deciding vote in the Senate. It would
be anomalous if the Vice-President were to have a role in the
amending process, but not the President or the state governors.
Hollingsworth and Hawke, which held that the President had no role
in the amendment, process should apply to the Vice-President by
analogy. Provision is made in the Ervin legislation for the Vice-
President to convene the constitutional convention, administer the
oath of office, and preside until the delegates elect a presiding
officer. 122
E. REPRESENTATION AT AND DELEGATES To AN ARTICLE V
CONVENTION.
One of the most important issues concerning an Article V
convention is representation. Should each state have one vote,
should delegates be apportioned strictly on the basis of population,
or according to some other scheme?
It seems reasonable that the framers, when devising the
convention method, contemplated a convention substantially
similar, if not identical, to the one they were then attending. The
1787 convention was organized on the basis of state representation.
Each state had one vote. Seven states, a simple majority,
constituted a quorum, a majority of those states present being
competent to decide all questions. 123 The provision in Article V for
a separate ratification stage was adopted after it was pointed out in
the debates that if the convention were to have both the power to
propose and to adopt amendments, 124 a majority of the states could
bind the whole union.
The entire scheme for amendment as provided for in Article V
is evidence that the framers viewed amendments to the
Constitution as alternations in the fundamental compact between
the states. In this compact each state is the theoretical and legal
equal of the others, regardless of such differences as wealth or
population. Article V provides that whenever two-thirds of the
legislatures of the several states apply, a convention shall be called.
This convention shall then propose amendments which when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states or by
conventions in the states, shall be valid. The states have an equal
122. S. 1272. supra note 14. § 8(a).
123. NI. FARR\ND. THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1962).
124. Supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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voice in both the application stage and in the ratification stage of
the amending process. It would be illogical to assume that the
framers did not intend for the states to have an equal voice during
the convention.12 5 Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 43
concerning Article V, "[i]t moreover equally enables the general
and state governments to originate the amendment of errors as they
may be pointed out by experience on one side or another.'
' 26
While the amendment power ultimately rests with the people, it is
exercised by them through the states, and, in the legal
contemplation of the Constitution, each state is regarded as an
equal. As stated by one eminent authority, Article V:
recognizes the concept of dual constituency of the
Federal Government. A ratification signifies not only the
assent of a section of the people of the United States,
expressed by their agent, but that of a state, regarded as a
political community, as well, and the vote of New York..
. has no more weight than that of. .. Nevada. Likewise,
no state may be deprived of its equal sufferage in the
Senate without its consent. Finally, a convention is to be
called upon the application of two-thirds of the states, and
here also the shout from New York has no more weight
than the whisper from, Nevada. 
127
It is interesting to note that the legislation originally drafted by
Senator Ervin provided for representation modeled after the 1787
convention; i.e., each state having one vote. 128 Senator Ervin,
however, was forced to modify this, after hearings, presumably as
the result of political pressure from the populous states. S. 1272
provides that a convention shall be composed of as many delegates
from each state as it is entitled to Senators and Representatives in
Congress. 1
2 9
The American Bar Association's Special Study Committee
believes that convention representation should be guided by the
Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" rule. It suggests
representation identical to that of the states in the House of
125. See Hearings on S. 2707, .upra note 14, at 33 (remarks ofSenator Hruska); Note, 85 HARV. L.
R.v., supra note 16, at 1625.
126. THt FEDERALIST No. 43 (Cooke ed. 1961 ) (emphasis added).
127. Platz, supra note 59, at 29.
128. "[IJn voting on any question before the convention each state shall have one vote which
shall be cast as the majority of the delegates from the state, present at the time, shall agree." S. 2307,
90th Cong., I st Sess., § 9(a) (1967).
129. S. 1272, supra note 14, § 7(a).
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Representatives. 130 Another writer has suggested a bicameral
convention modeled after Congress. 131
Those who disagree with the idea of representation at an
Article V convention patterned after the 1787 convention either
ignore the clear intent of the framers, 132 or in the alternative argue
that even if this was their intent we should no longer be bound to
follow it. 133
If the argument that a convention should be based upon
proportionate representation is followed to its logical conclusion,
then representation at an Article V convention should be totally on
the basis of one man, one vote. There is no compelling reason, once
the intent of the framers is cast aside, to accord each state even a
minimum of one delegate, since even this would result in
population deviations of up to fifty percent. 134 While the specific
language of Article V arguably does not bar a convention based
upon proportionate representation according to population, such a
convention would be an anomaly within the Article V scheme of
amendment. The application and ratification provisions of Article
V clearly give each state an equal vote. This language cannot be
ignored. What would be the advantage of having a convention,,
based solely upon proportionate representation by population,
propose amendments which would have to be ratified with each
state having one vote. Such an interpretation would merely place a
barrier upon the practical use of this method. If each state had an
equal vote at an Article V convention, amendments proposed from
such a convention would stand a far greater chance of adoption
because majority agreement and compromise would already have
been hammered out between the states at the convention level.
The clear intent of the framers, that an Article V convention should
be based upon equal state representation, is an inherent con-
stitutional requirement of Article V. While on occasion, when ex-
ceptional circumstances were present, the Supreme Court has wan-
dered away from the strict intent of the framers,135 the
traditional approach of the Court being to follow the clear intent of
130. A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 35-36.
131. Note, 70 HARV. L. REV., supra note 74, at 1076 n.50.
132. Kauper, The Alternative Amendment Process. Some Observations, 66 MICH. L. REV. 903, 909
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Kauper]; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV., supra note 74, at 1075.
133. Bonfield, supra note 60, at 988: McClesky, Along the Midway: Some Thoughts on Democratic
Constitution-Amending, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (1968); Note, 85 HARV. L. REV., supra note
16, at 1625-27; A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 35.
134. SeeA.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 36.
135. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954); Home Building Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1933); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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the framers when interpreting the Constitution. 36 If this re-
quirement of Article V is outmoded and archaic, like the electoral
college is argued to be, then the proper remedy is to amend the
Constitution not to ignore the clear intent of the framers or to
rationalize it away.
Accepting the viewpoint that each state has one vote at an Ar-
ticle V convention on all matters, it follows that each state should
be allowed to select its delegates, in any manner it chooses. 3 ' A
State should have members of its delegation either elected or ap-
pointed. The states' legislatures would be in charge of the
delegation selection. A state could put in its delegation as many
persons as it desired, though each state would have but one vote at
the convention. Presumably, however, practical and financial con-
siderations would prevent an excessive number from being sent. If
the 1787 convention precedent is followed, and a state appoints its
delegation, supposedly only those best qualified, e.g., respected
elder statesmen and state political leaders, would be appointed.
Prudent men, not likely to be given to any excesses or abuses of the
convention process, certainly would be chosen.
The Ervin legislation, proceeding upon the premise that
Congress has the power to prescribe the selection of delegates to an
Article V convention, provides that two delegates shall be elected at
large and one elected from each congressional district according to
state law. Any vacancy occurring in a state.delegation is to be filled
by appointment by the state's governor. 138
A final issue is whether there are any constitutional limitations
upon whom may be a delegate to an Article V convention. Article
I, Section 6 of the Constitution states the following:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office un-
136. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905); Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41, 95 (1900): Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S 662, 670 (1889); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1. 12 (1887): Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 722 (1838).
The Supreme Court has held that if the meaning of a constitutional provision is at all
doubtful, wherever reasonably possible to do so, the doubt should be resolved in a way to forward the
evident purpose with which the provision was adopted. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900);
jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1880).
The Supreme Court has long recognized the propriety of drawing upon the debates of the
1787 Convention, The Federalist, and other writings of the founding fathers to construe vague
constitutional provisions. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Pollack v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895): Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
137. "It would seem proper for each state to determine the procedure for the election of its
delegates and the qualifications of the electors, since matters of this kind have traditionally been left
to the states." Note, 70 HARv. L. REV., supra note 74. at 1076. Seealso Platz, supra note 59, at 37-38.
138. S. 1272, supra note 14, § 7(a).
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der the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
increased during such time; and no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office. '3 9
Are members of Congress prevented by this provision from
being delegates to an Article V convention? The Supreme Court
has suggested that an "Office under the Authority of the United
States" must be one created under Article II's appointive
provisions, 140 consequently excluding the position of delegate to a
-constitutional convention, which arises under Article V. Selection
of a member of Congress by a state to a position on its delegation to
an Article V convention clearly does not come within the policy
behind Article I, Section 6, and thus should not be barred.' 4' The
Articles of Confederation contained a prohibition similar to the
present Article I, Section 6,142 yet several delegates to the 1787
convention were members of the Continental Congress.
43
Theoretically state laws and state constitutions may prescribe direc-
tly or indirectly who may .not serve as Article V convention
delegates, e.g., minors, incompetents, criminals, etc.
F. FINANCIAL ISS1IES PERTAINING TO AN ARTICLE V.
CONSTITI TIONAL CONVENTION.
Article V is silent about the financing of a constitutional con-
vention. It would seem that Congress has inherent power and the
responsibility, incidental to its power to call the convention, to
provide reasonable funds for the convention. Congress' minimal
responsibility should be to provide the actual costs of the con-
vention, leaving to the states the burden of travel expenses and per-
sonal expense money of the delegates. 144 Nothing, however, would
preclude Congress from paying for the expenses of convention
delegates. Hopefully, whether it be the federal or. the state govern-
ment, some one will pay the expenses of the delegates, so that being
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, §6.
140. United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525 (1888): United States v. Germaine. 99 U.S. 508
(1878).
141. See Forkosch, The AlternativeAmending Clause in Article .' Reflections and Suegestions, 51 MINN.
L. REv. 1053, 1072-73 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Forkosch].
142. Article V of' the Articles of Confederation provided that "nor shall any person being a
delegate [to Congressl. be capable of holding any' office under the United States. for which he. or
another for his benefit receives any salary, fees. or emolunent of any kind."
M. FARRAND. THE FRANMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 213 (1962).
143. A.B.A. Study. supra note 2. at 37.
144. Forkosch, supra note 141, at 1082 n.103.
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a delegate to a constitutional convention would not become a
privilege accorded only to the affluent.
An interesting question would arise if Congress, disfavoring
the convention, were to attempt to use the "power of the purse"
over it, and totally deny it funding or appropriate an insufficient
fund. One writer has suggested that in such a case, the convention
would have inherent power to appropriate its own funding. 145 This
position is untenable at best. A convention could not enforce such
an "appropriation." In our era of electronic media, however,
should a convention duly convened find itself without funding, it
could likely make a successful appeal to the American people and
thus raise sufficient funds. Furthermore, a duly convened con-
vention, as an agency of the United States, probably could charge
its expenses, and possibly those of its delegates, to the credit of the
United States, leaving creditors with the right to recover such sums
against the United States in the federal courts.
The Ervin legislation authorizes the payment of such sums as
may be necessary for the payment of the expenses of such a con-
vention, 146 and provides that the concurrent resolution calling for
the convention shall set delegate compensation for each day of ser-
vice and for travel.
147
G. THE POWER OF THE STATES OVER AN ARTICLE V.
CONSTITITIONAL CONVENTION AND THE ALTERNATIVE AMENDING
PROCESS.
The initial question which arises in this'area is whether states
have the power, via their applications to Congress, to limit the
scope of an Article V convention. If thirty-four states petition
Congress for an Article V convention to propose a pro-life amend-
ment, can this convention, so formed, exparnd its deliberations
beyond that topic? The authorities overwhelmingly believe that the
states have no such power. 148 In the words of one writer:
even though the application were for a limited purpose,
it would seem that the state legislatures would have no
authority to limit an instrumentality set up under the
Federal Constitution. In reality, the right of the
145. Platz. supra note 59. at 47.
146. S. 1272, supra note 14. § 8(b).
147. Id..A 7(d).
148. Srr Bonfield. supra note 60. at 995: Platz, supra note 59. at 45: Wheeler. supra note 71. at
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legislatures is confined to applying for a convention, and
any statements of purpose in their petitions would bc
irrelevant as to the scope of the powers of the con-
vention.
149
Another question concerning this issue is whether a state has
the power to order its delegation home if it becomes dissatisfied
with the way the convention is proceeding, or whether it can direct
its delegation to vote a certain way at the convention, or onllv u)on
certain matters, the answer to these questions would seem to be no.
If the viewpoint is accepted that a state cannot limit the scope of the
convention directly via its application, then it should not be able to
do so indirectly by controlling the actions of its delegates in the con-
vention. The framers contemplated that an Article V convention
would be a deliberative body which would discuss freely and fully
any proposed constitutional changes.'" In Hawkc v. Smith, No. 1,51
the Supreme Court, commenting upon the ratification process,
stated that "both methods of ratification, by legislatures or con-
ventions, call for action by deliberative a.sembhla.e. ,
deliberative nature of a constitutional convention would be
destroyed if delegates were subject to control by their state govern-
ments like puppets on a string, and their powers of' participation
limited. In conjunction with this area, it would seem appropriate
that some sort of immunity be given to delegates to an Article V
convention for their actions in connection therewith. 15
3
Once two-thirds of the states have petitioned Congress for an
Article V convention, and the call has been issued, must a state at-
tend? One author suggests that a state need not attend an Article V
convention, 1 54 though it seems unlikely in this (lay and age that 8
state would waive its opportunity to participate in such an assem-
blage.
Finally, Article V gives the states power to ratify proposed
amendments, whether proposed by Congress or by a convention.
In Coleman v. Miller, 155 the Supreme Court held that the question of
the effect of a previous rejection of a constitutional amendment on a
subsequent ratification was a political one to be determined by
Congress. The Court held that absent a fixed period for
149. .. ORFFI t), supra note 24, at 44-45.
150. Bonficld, supra note 60, at 992.
151. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
152. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
153. The Ervin legislation follows this approach. SeeS. 1272. supra note 14, § 7(c).
154. Forkosch. supra note 141, at 1067-68.
155. 307 U.S. 433(1939).
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ratification, the question of what was a reasonable time for
ratification was a political question for. Congress to decide.
Following Coleman by analogy, Congress would have the power to
decide if a state could rescind its ratification of a proposed amend-
ment prior to ratification by the required number of states. In the
past, Congress has determined that a state cannot rescind its
ratification of a proposed amendment. The current trend, however,
seems to be towards allowing a state to withdraw or rescind its own
ratification prior to ratification by the required number of states.
Since a consensus is. required throughout the amendment process,
recission is consistent because this consensus no longer exists as to a
rescinding state. The Ervin legislation follows this approach. 
156
When analyzing the relationship of the states to the Article V
convention method, it must be remembered that Article V is
superior to state law under the "Supremacy Clause. ,,157 The states
thus possess no powers which go contrary to the letter and spirit of
Article V.
H. THE POWER OF CONGRESS OVER THE ARTICLE V
CONVENTION METHOD
Congress has the power, incidental to its ministerial duty to
call a convention, to ascertain whether the prerequisites of its duty
to call exist. 158 The power of Congress over the Article V con-
vention method is primarily based upon the fact that, under Article
V, it is to "call" the convention. Congress' powers are said to be
incidental to, or implied by, its power to call the convention.
59
Since Article V speaks in general terms, Congress, it is said, is best
suited to fill the gaps in the convention method.' 6 In Dillon v.
Gloss, 161 the Supreme Court stated as follows:
An examination of Article V discloses that it is intended
to invest Congress with a wide range of power in
proposing amendments. 162
As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms,
leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail
156. S. 1272, supra note 14, § 13(a), 13(b). See also S. REP. No. 93-293, supra note 8, at 19-20
(additional views of Senators Bayh and Cook).
157. U. S. CONST. art. VI, 2d.
158. Kauper, supra note 132, at 906.
159. Id. at 906-07.
160. See Black, supra note 94, at 964.
161. 256 U.S. 368(1921).
162. Id. at 373.
ARTICLE V
as the public interests and changing conditions may
require; and Article V is no exception to the rule.
163
In Dillon, the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to
set a time period for ratification. In Coleman v. Miller, 164 the
Supreme Court held that, absent a set time limit upon ratification,
Congress was best suited to determine what constituted a
reasonable period for ratification of a proposed amendment, and
that the Courts would not interfere in that determination.
Support for Congress' power over the Article V convention
method is also found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the
"necessary and proper" clause, which provides that 'Congress
shall have Power. . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.')
165
Added to this is the sweeping pronouncement by Justice Marshall
in McCulloch v. Maryland,166 "[1]et the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional. ''167
Congress' power over the Article V convention method is
subject only to the limitations which the Constitution places upon
it. When ascertaining the powers of Congress in this area, the
purpose behind the convention method must always be kept in
mind. This method of amendment was placed in the Constitution
to insure that the states would always have an avenue of amending
open to them should the national government become oppressive.
In exercising its powers over the Article V convention method,
Congress could severely inhibit the use of this alternative
method. 168 Keeping the purpose behind the convention method in
mind, it would seem that whenever there is a serious doubt as to
whether Congress has a particular power over the Article V
163. Id. at 376.
164. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
165. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 18.
166. 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
167. Id. at 421.
168. Senator Ervin recognized this possibility when drafting his legislation.
This legislation can be drawn so as to place as many hurdles as possible in the way of
effective use of the process: or it can be drawn in a manner that will make such a
process a possible, however improbable, method of amendment. The first alternative
would be a flagrant disavowal of the clear language and intended function of Article V.
I have assumed that the Congress will wish to take the second road, and the bill is
drawn with that principle in mind.
Ervin, supra note 17. at 880.
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convention method, a presumption against the existence of such a
power should arise.
The proper view with respect to Congress' power over the
Article V convention method is that the only powers which
Congress possesses are those concerning housekeeping matters.169
It would seem proper for Congress to set the date and location of
the convention; put a reasonable time limit upon the length of its
deliberations (it can hardly be suggested that an Article V
convention once convened can continue in existence forever); and
to appropriate a reasonable amount to finance the convention's
expenses. Under the view accepted in this article, Article V implies
a convention where each state has an equal vote. Consequently
Congress cannot otherwise constitute the convention, e.g., base
rcpresentation on population or other factors. If the opposite view
is accepted then Congress could determine the composition of the
convention on some reasonable basis.
Under Dillon, Congress may set a time limit for states to ratify
a proposed amendment. By analogy, Congress may set a time limit
for the validity of applications for an Article V convention. It would
appear then that an Article V convention would have inherent
power to determine its own internal rules of procedure, 170 and any
attempt by Congress to try to determine the convention's
procedures would be futile.
1. THE SCOPE OF AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION'S At ITHORITY.
As previously discussed, it is generally agreed that states have
no power, via their applications, to limit the scope of an Article V
convention's deliberations. One of the most vexing questions is
whether Congress, in its call of a convention, can limit the subject
matter upon which the convention may deliberate and act.
The observation has been made that "[t]here is a general
aversion to tinkering with the Constitution... "I" In his Farewell
Address, President Washington warned, "[o]ne method of assault
(against the Union) may be to effect, in the forms of the
Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the
system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly
overthrown.'" 71 2 Overall, the American people are quite satisfied
169. Note. 85 HARV. L. RE\'., supra note 16. at 1617.
170. Note, 70 HARV. L. REV.. supra note 74, at 1076.
171. Wheeler, supra note 71. at 803.
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with our constitutional system. Justice Felix Frankfurter once
observed the following:
For the general scheme of our constitutional system there
is deep acquiescence and even attachment. One hears
occasionally loose talk that our form of government is an
anachronism, and dissatisfaction with some act of
government or some failure to act is vaguely charged
against our constitutional mechanism. But much more
significant than these expressions of episodic discontent is
the absence of any widespread or sustained demand for a
general revision of our Constitution. 1 73
There have been, however, occasional suggestions that our entire
national framework of government be revised. 
17 4
Our present Constitution, amended relatively few times, has
been in existence nearly two hundred years during which time a
complex social, political and economic system has developed. Our
present Constitution protects many vested interests, be they
property rights or civil liberties. Many people regard the prospect
of an Article V convention as an unknown, uncertain element in
our system, having the potential to stir constitutional waters.1 7
Some suggest that an Article V constitutional convention once
called into being might cast aside its mandate, draft an entirely new
constitution, declare it effective, and invite the states and existing
government to acquiesce in it. 176 It has even been wildly speculated
that an Article V constitutional convention could simply declare
itself the new national government.' 7 7 These Arguments arise from
the theory of "convention sovereignty." In 1911, Senator Hayburn
stated the theory as follows: "When the people of the United States
meet in a constitutional convention there is no power to limit their
action. They are greater than the Constitution, and they can repeal
every section of it because they are the peers of the people who
made it.1' 1 78 It has been properly pointed out that there is no merit
to this theory.1 79 Of course, it is possible that an Article V
172. Washington's Farewell Address, quoted in J. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: YESTERDAY, TODAY - AND TOMMORROW? 269 (1924).
173. F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 51 (1930).
174. See, e.g., Tugwell, Rewriting the Constitution: A Center Report, CENTER MAGAZINE 18 (Mar.
1968).
175. See, e.g., Sorensen, The Quiet Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution, SATURDAY REVIEW. 17, 18
(July 15, 1967).
176. Wheeler, supra note 71, at 801-02.
177. Carson, Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention, 66 MICH. L. REV., 921, 922-23
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Carson[.
178. 46 CONG. REC. S 2769 (1911) (remarks ofSenator Hayburn).
179. Bonfield, supra note 60, at 993.
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convention could take such actions as declaring itself to be the new
national government or proclaiming a new constitution. This,
however is highly improbable. The chances of this ever happening
are small, and the chances of the success of such a move even
smaller.
In addition to these unfounded and exaggerated concerns, a
more reasonable concern has been aired; i.e., that once an Article
V convention is formed, its delegates might propose amendments
to the Constitution on subjects different from those placed by
Congress in the call and cited by states in their applications.
180
Some have suggested that an Article V convention, if it desires,
could choose to redraft the Constitution and submit the new draft
to the states for ratification. 18' Even though these proposals stand
little chance of ultimate ratification, it apparently is felt that their
mere proposition by a prestigous body, as would be an Article V
convention, would be greatly disruptive and bring into question the
basic fabric of our national government.
The Ervin legislation attempts to limit the scope of an Article
V convention's deliberations and actions. It provides that
Congress, when calling the convention, shall in its concurrent
resolution set forth the nature of the amendment or amendments
which the convention is called to consider. 182 Each delegate to the
convention is to subscribe to an oath, before taking his seat, that he
shall be committed during the conduct of the convention to refrain
from proposing or casting his vote in favor of any proposed
constitutional amendment relating to any subject not named or
described in the concurrent resolution calling the convention.
183
The legislation provides specifically that no convention called
under the act may propose any amendment or amendments of a
different nature than those stated in Congress' concurrent
resolution. 184 Finally, the legislation provides that all amendments
proposed by the convention be sent to the states for ratification,
unless Congress passes a concurrent resolution disapproving the
submission of a proposed amendment on the grounds that it
includes a subject different from or not included among the subjects
named in our described in Congress' concurrent resolution calling
for the convention. 1
85
180. 113 CONG. REC. S 5458 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1967) (r.emarks ofSenatorJavits); id. at S. 5462
(remarks of Senator Proxmire).
181. L. ORFIFLn. upra note 24. at 44-45: Platz. supra note 59, at 31.
182. S- 1272. supra note 14. § 6(a).
183. ld. § 8(a).
184. Id- § 10(b).
185. Id- § I l(b)(1)(B).
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Several policy arguments support the concept of a limited
Article V convention. First, if an Article V convention were "wide-
open" once the convention were convened, it would immediately
become the focal point of every dissident group in the nation
seeking constitutional change. Delegates to the convention would
be subjected to intense pressure from many groups resulting in the
impairment of the deliberative quality of the convention. The 1787
convention decided to hold its deliberations in secret, hiding from
the public its day to day shift in temperament and announcing only
its final product. 18 6 An Article V convention, held now, would find
it most difficult to duplicate this. 18 7 As a result of the hectic
conditions inherent in a wide-open convention, the ultimate
product might not reflect thoughtful deliberation. Such a wide-
open convention could become a circus. However, were the
convention limited in its discussions and in its ability to propose
amendments, the debate need not be sidetracked.
Another argument in favor of limiting the scope of an Article
V convention would be that it would allow an intelligent choice of
delegates. 188 If the convention were called,' for example, to propose
a pro-life amendment, then the state, when selecting its convention
delegates, could choose persons with knowledge and expertise in
the particular area.
Finally, it can be argued that the concept of a wide-open
convention might discourage the states from using the convention
method. The states will make greater use of this method if they
know that the authority of the convention will be limited to
discussion of the problem which they, and the other thirty-three
states, are interested in correcting. 18 9
It appears desirable to limit the scope of an Article V
convention to the subject matter placed in the call by Congress on
the basis of these policy arguments. The determination of whether
Congress may limit the scope of an Article V convention rests,
however, not upon policy considerations, but upon whether the
186. The 1787 convention kept its deliberations secret because, "it was considered important
that the delegates should be protected from critit:ism and that their discussions should be free from
the pressure ofpublic opinion."
M. FARRAND, TH FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TIE UNITED STATEs, 58 (1962).
187. [T]he proceedings of convention delegates will he conducted in the intense glare
of publicity. Every word will be transcrihed. Imputations of motive, analyses, and
predictions will fill the newspaper columns and flood the airways. Television will
obtrude itself on the proceedings, in the name of the so-called 'right of the people to
know.' A multitude of issues clamoring for attention will leave no time for reflection or
long-range thought.
Carson, supra note 177, at 927.
188. A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 17.
189. Kauper, supra note 132, at 911-12. See also Comment, supra -te 2, at 513.
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Constitution mandates that an Article V convention be free from
such a limitation.
To determine whether Article V contemplates limited
conventions, an attempt must be made to ascertain the probable
intent of the framers in this regard. The argument that the framers
envisioned Article V conventions as limited conventions when they
drafted the provision is presented first, followed by the opposite
argument.
It is argued that pre-1787 state convention practices support
the idea of limited conventions. 190 The framers, it is urged, had this
type of convention in mind when they provided for one in Article
V. Support for this contention is allegedly found in Article XIX of
the first draft of the Constitution, delivered to the full convention
on August 6th by the Committee of Detail, and passed by the
convention on August 30th. That Article read as follows: "On the
application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States in the
Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the
United States shall call a Convention.for that purpose. 191
Support for this view is also found in The Federalist No. 43
where Madison wrote that Article V, "equally enables the general
and the- state government to originate the amendment of errors as they
may be pointed out by experience on one side or another.' ' 192
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 85, had the following to say
concerning the-amendment power:
[E]very amendment to the Constitution, if one
established, would be a single proposition, and might be
brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity
for management or compromise in relation to any other
point - no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite
number would at once bring the matter to a decisive
issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather 10
States, were united in the desire of a particular
amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place.
There can, therefore, be no comparison between the
facility of affecting an amendment and that of
establishing, in the first instance, a complete
constitution. 193
190. A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 11-17.
191. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 27, at 188 (emphasis added).
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
193. THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
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These two extracts from The Federalist Papers have been interpreted
to indicate that the framers intended Article V conventions to be
limited in scope, having only the power to rectify particular errors
and not to redraft the whole Constitution. This interpretation,
however, has been met with some disagreement. 1
94
The argument in favor of a wide-open convention being
envisioned by the framers finds its strongest support in the very
words of Article V, that "Congress. . . on the Application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments ,,195 The use of the word
"Amendments" rather than a phrase such as "for proposing an
amendment" is clear evidence, it is argued, that Article V
conventions were meant to have wide-open powers, and that a
convention once convened has the authority to propose anything
which it deems to be in the best interests of the nation, regardless of
the reasons for which the convention was requested by the states,
and regardless of the limitations which Congress may attempt to
place on the convention.
Support for this position is also found in the precedent of the
1787 convention which clearly exceeded its powers.' 96 That
convention was called ". . . for the sole and express purpose of
revising the Articles of Confederation... '"97 The Convention was
not authorized to draft an entirely new frame of government.
Additionally, the Constitution provided that it would become
effective when ratified by nine states, contrary to the provision in
the Articles of Confederation which required unanimous consent
before the Articles could be altered.1 98 The framers clearly
recognized that no plan of government is perfect. 199 Therefore,
they surely must have contemplated that the plan they were then
creating might someday be required to give way to an entirely
different framework of government. That being the case, and given
the precedent of the 1787 convention where they admittedly went
beyond their powers, 20 0 surely they realized and intended that a
convention called under Article V might someday have to draft a
totally different framework of government or otherwise address
problems which it perceived in addition to the ones for which it was
called.
194. See, e.g., Black, supra note 16, at 197, wherein the author argues that The Federalist, Nos. 43
and85 do not support the idea ofa limited convention.
195. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
196. Martig, supra note 26, at 1256.
197.J. ELLIOT, supra note 28.
198. Supra note 25.
199. Supra notes 29, 34, 43, and 57.
200. Comment, supra note 2. at 506.
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Those who disagree with this view attempt to distinguish the
1787 convention on grounds that it was a "revolutionary"
convention and that Article V only contemplates "constitutional"
conventions. Judge Jameson, in his treaties, defined the two types
of conventions. A "revolutionary" convention is said to
consist of those bodies of men, who in times of political
crisis, assume or have cast upon them, provisionally, the
function of government. They either supplant or
supplement the existing government organization .
[t]hey are not subaltern or ancillary to any other
institution whatever, but lords paramount of the entire
political domain . . . In short, a Revolutionary




differs from the [revolutionary convention] in being as its
name implies, constitutional; not simply as having for its
object the framing or amending of Constitutions, but as
being within, rather than without, the place of the
fundamental law; as ancillary and subservient and not
hostile and paramount to it. . . . It is charged with a
definite, and not a discretionary and indeterminate
function. It always acts under a commission .... It never
supplants the existing organization. It never governs. 20 2
The 1787 convention, it is said, took place during
extraordinary times and its actions were justified solely on the basis
of the circumstances which had led the united colonies to the brink
of dissolution. The Articles of Confederation, it is argued, had no
viable amendment provision like the present Constitution. The
circumstances surrounding the 1787 convention are unlikely to
happen again. The framers believed that they had created a strong
federal union. They did not contemplate an Article V convention
ever having the potential of a "revolutionary convention." It was
to be a "constitutional convention." It also is pointed out that even
though the 1787 convention did exceed its authority, its actions
were subsequently ratified by Congress and the states. 20 3
201. J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAl CONVENTION 6 (4th ed. 1887).
202. Id. at 10.
203. A.B.A. Study, supra note 2, at 14.
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The 1787 convention seems to fit somewhere between
Jameson's two definitions. It clearly went beyond its express
mandate, but it did not function as, or purport to be, a provisional
government. Naturally, the framers intended an Article V
convention to be a "constitutional" convention operating within
the framework of the Constitution. But what was this framework
meant to be? Does Article V contemplate a convention with the
powers to propose anything which it feels to be in the best interests
of the nation, or does it contemplate a limited convention?
Here again, the purpose behind the convention method must
be considered. The Article V convention method was designed to
be an alternative amending process, for use of the states in the
event that Congress became oppressive. With this in mind, it seems
that Congress must not be allowed to have the power to limit the
scope of the convention's deliberations and actions. Congress' only
powers should be over housekeeping matters. A power in Congress
to limit the scope of the convention goes to the very heart of the
reason behind the convention method, and for this reason,
Congress does not have the power to limit the scope of an Article V
convention's deliberations and actions. 20 4 The Ervin legislation's
attempt to limit the scope of an Article V constitutional convention
to the same subject matter placed by Congress in the call would
therefore be unconstitutional.
There is, however, no reason to fear such an interpretation of
an Article V convention's powers. An Article V convention only
has the power to "propose" amendments. Any amendments, or
new Constitution, have to be ratified by three-fourths of the states
in order to take effect. 20 5 If a proposition is issued by an Article V
convention and subsequently ratified by the required number of
states, one can hardly be in a position-to complain about it.206 Even
if the mere propostion of proposals by an Article V convention
causes great debate and discussion, and calls into question the basic
fabric of the national government, such discussion would only
result in a stronger national government.
It has been pointed out that Congress, which has power to
initiate constitutional amendments upon the vote of two-thirds of
the members of both houses, has not yet "run away" with the
204. Black. supra note 16. at 2(13: Platz. supra note 59. at 46: Wheeler. supra note 71, at 796:
.Note. 70 HAR'. L. REV.. supra note 74. at 1076.
205. Dirksen. supra note 4. at 873.
206.J. STORVY. supra note 57. ,§ 1830. 1831.
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Constitution or otherwise abused the amendment powers.207 There
is no valid reason to expect an Article V constitutional convention
to do so either.
The proper statement of an Article V convention's powers
would be that such a convention is a deliberative body, created
ministerially by Congress at the request of the states which, when
duly convened, possesses the amendment power under Article V,
that power being subject to no limitations other than those in the
constitution.208 If Congress has no power to limit the scope of an
Article V convention's deliberations and actions, then it cannot
refuse to transmit to the states for ratification any and all
propositions which the convention originates.
If and when the first Article V convention is held, it would be
desirable for the delegates selected thereto to voluntarily refrain
from proposing any amendments upon subjects other than those
cited in the call or in state applications, and thus establish, by
precedent, a self-imposed limitation upon the convention, which
could always give way in times of crisis.
J. SHOI ILD ARTICLE V ITSELF BE AMENIED?
Over the years there have been numerous attempts to amend
Article V.209 Some have been aimed at Article V's convention
method. 210 Others have suggested that the convention method be
stricken from Article V.211 Still others have urged that it be
replaced by a different method of allowing the states to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. 212 It has also been suggested that,
rather than eliminating or replacing Article V's convention
method, it be amended in order to clear up the present
ambiguities. 213
The Article V convention method should neither be
eliminated from Article V nor replaced. While it has never recently
207. 113 CONG. REc. 11113 (1967) (remarks ofSenator Hruska).
208. L. ORFIFLD, supra note 24, at 45; Wheeler, supra note 71, at 796.
209. See Martig, supra note 25, at 1275-83, for a review ofthe efforts up to 1937 to amend Article
V.
210. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 24, at 168-72 wherein the author reviews proposed refom ofthe
national convention amendment procedure.
211. Martig, supra note 25, at 1284. See also Hearings on S.J. R. 134, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)
at 3-4, 65, 79, 84.
212. See Black, supra note 94, at 958; 117 CoNC. Rrc. S 16, 519 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1971).
213. See, e.g., Platz, supra note 59, at 47-49, (where the writer suggests several changes in Article
V to clear up ambiguities in it); Comment, supra note 2, at 526-539 (where the writer suggests that
Article V be amended to (lear up present uncertanties and offers a proposed draft of a new Article
V).
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been used, it has in the past and still serves a useful function. The
reasons behind its creation are still potentially valid.
Article V should, however, be amended to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Hawke v. Smith, No. 1214 In that case,
the Court struck down a provision in the Ohio state constitution
which required all proposed constitutional amendments to be
submitted to a popular referendum. The Court found this to be
contrary to the requirement in Article V that ratification be by
"legislatures" and that a popular referendum was not a legislature
as contemplated by the framers, a legislature being- in their mind a
deliberative representative body which was charged with making
the laws which governed the people.
The amendment process, at all stages, should be accompanied
by thoughtful deliberation. The framers provided that a state's
ratification of proposed amendments be either by action of the state
legislature or by convention, leaving Congress to choose the mode
of ratification. To date, with one exception, Congress has chosen
ratification by state legislatures. Article V should be amended to
permit Congress a third choice, by popular referendum. In 1920,
when Hawke was decided, a meaningful debate could not have been
conducted on a statewide basis prior to a popular referendum.
Thus, ratification by referendum would not have been
accompanied by thoughtful deliberation prior to the state's action.
However, with radio, television, and other mass media of our time,
a thoughtful debate and disscussion could easily be had on a
statewide basis on a proposed constitutional amendment prior to a
popular referendum. This would allow for deliberation at the
ratification stage, were ratification to be by popular referendum.
The framers typically entrusted ratification to the
representative body of the people in the state rather than to the
people themselves because'of their general distrust of government
by the masses. This attitude is clearly out of date, and there is no
valid reason today to prohibit ratification by popular referendum.
In fact, it should be the preferred method.
K.J ISTICIABILITY OF Q I ESTIONS ARISING INDER ARTICLE V
The Ervin legislation attempts to cut off judicial review of
questions arising under the Article V convention method by
providing that questions concerning adoption of a state's
application, questions pertaining to the ability of the convention to
214. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
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initiate proposals different from or additional to those placed by
Congress in its concurrent resolution calling the convention, and
questions concerning a state's ratification or rejection of proposed
constitutional amendments, "shall be determined solely by the
Congress of the United States, and its decisions shall be binding on
all others including State and Federal courts. "215
It has long been settled that the Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction, "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make. "216 Therefore, it would seem that
Congress could successfully cut off appellate review of Article V
constitutional questions from the Supreme Court. Congress,
however, has no power to limit the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction. The Constitution provides that, "[i]n all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction." 217 It is probable that many potential
suits over Article V will involve a state as a party. In such cases,
Congress' attempt to limit the determination of questions over the
Article V convention method would be to no avail.
Even if jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is obtained, the
question remains whether the Court might voluntarily refrain from
deciding the issue raised on the grounds that it is a "political
question." State courts have almost uniformly held that the
question of amending the state constitution is justifiable. 218 After
reviewing the relevant Supreme Court decisions, however, one can
only speculate what the Court might do if presented with a suit
arising out of the Article V convention method.
In the 1798 case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia,2 9 the Supreme
Court held that the eleventh amendment was validly enacted and
that Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution did not require the
approval of the President in the amendment process. At this early
date the Supreme Court seemed to be of the view that controversies
over the amendment of the Constitution were justiciable, though
the issue was not specifically presented to them in those terms.
Chief Justice Taney, in Luther v. Borden, 220 indicated that the Court
believed that questions concerning the amendment of constitutions
215. S. 1272. supra note 14, § 3(b), 5(c). 10(b) and 13(c).
216. U.S. CONST. art. III 2: Ex parte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)506 (1868).
217. U.S. CONST. art. III 2.
218. Comment. supra note 2, at 516.
219. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
220. 48 U.S. (7 Howard) 1 (1849).
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were nonjusticiable political questions. 221 In Dodge v. Woolsey, 222
Justice Wayne determined that the power to amend the
Constitution was constitutionally limited. 223 The Supreme Court,
in White v. Hart, 224 said of the validity of a state's ratification of a
constitutional amendment, "[t]he action of Congress upon the
subject cannot be inquired into. The case is clearly one in which the
judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department of
the government, and is concluded by it." ,225 It would seem that by
the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court felt that
questions regarding amending the constitution were political and
non justiciable.
In Myers v. Anderson, it was argued that the fifteenth
amendment was invalid, if construed to apply to state and
municipal elections, on grounds that it violated the provisions of
Article V which state that no state, without its consent, shall be
deprived of' its equal representation in the Senate. 227 The Court
ignored the argument. In Hawke v. Smith No. 1,228 the Supreme
Court held that a provision in the Ohio constitution which required
that all proposed constitutional amendments be submitted to a
popular referendum was violative of the terms of Article V, a
popular referendum not being within the definition of the terms
"legislatures." The Court also reaffirmed the holding of
Hollingsworth. The Solicitor General argued in the National
Prohibition Cases, 2 2 9 that the question of whether the eighteenth
amendment was within the amending power was one committed to
the political, not the judicial branch of the government. 230 The
Court ignored the plea and held that the eighteenth amendment
was duly' enacted and that its substantive content was within the
221.
In finrming the constitutions of the different States, after the Declaration of
Independence. and in the various changes and alterations which have since been
made, the political department has alwavs determined whether the' proposed
constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State. and the
Judicial power has followed its decision.
Liiiher %. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Howard) 1, 38-39 (1849).
222.59 U.S (18 Hooward) 331 (1855).
223.
"The Constitution] is supreme over (he people of the United States, aggregatelv and
in their separate sovereignties, because they have excluded themselves from any direct
or immediate agency in making amendments to it, and have directed that
amendments should 1be made reptsentatively for them .... " Dodge %-. Woolsey. 59
U. S. (18 Howard)331,348 (1855).
224.80 U S. (13 Wall.)646 (1871).
225. White v. Hart. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1871.
226. 238 U.S. 368(1915).
227. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 374(1915).
228. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
229. 253 U.S. 350(1920).
230. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 381-82 (1.920).
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power to amend reserved by Article V. In Dillon v. Gloss,2 3 1 the
Court held that Congress could set a reasonable tit'e for
ratification of proposed constitutional amendments, and that the
seven year period set by it-was a reasonable time. The Court stated
the following:
Whether a definite period for ratification shall be fixed so
that all may know what it is and speculation on what is a
reasonable time may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a
matter of detail which Congress may determine as an
incident of its power to designate the mode of
ratification 232
Fairchild v. Hughes,233 and its companion case, Leser v.
Garnett,234 both involved the validity of the nineteenth amendment.
In Fairchild, the Court held that a taxpayer lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the amendment prior to its
ratification by the states. In Leser the Court held that the
proclamation by a state's Secretary of State that the state had
ratified the amendment was "conclusive upon the courts. ' ' 23 The
Court, in Druggan v. Anderson, 236 held that the moment the
eighteenth amendment was ratified by the required number of
states it became law, and that Congress could legislate in
anticipation of its effective date of operation. In United States v.
Sprague, 237 the Court held that the choice of the mode of ratification
of amendments was in the sole discretion of the Congress. The
Court in a later case took judicial notice of the fact that the twenty-
first amendment, which repealed the eighteenth amendment, had
been ratified, and held that neither the Congress nor the Courts
could give it continued validity. 238 These early twentieth century
cases seem to show a general willingness on the part of the Court at
that time to decide both substantive and procedural questions
concerning the amendment process.
The most important case in this area is Coleman v. Miller, 2 39
wherein the Supreme Court showed a definite shift in attitude. The
Court there held that the question of the effect of a previous
231. 256 U.S. 368(1921).
232. Id. at 376.
233. 258 U.S. 126(1922).
234. 258 U.S. 130(1922).
235. Id. at 137.
236. 269 U.S. 36 (1925).
237. 282 U.S. 716(1931).
238. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934).
239. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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rejection of a proposed constitutional amendment by a state on its
subsequent ratification was a political question to be settled by
Congress. 240 The Court also held that the question of what
constitutes a reasonable time for ratification, absent a set time limit
by Congress, was likewise a political question for the Congress to
decide. 24 1 It was contended that the vote of the Lieutenant
Governor should not have been counted towards the subsequent
ratification because he was not part of the "legislature" within the
meaning of Article V. The Court stated that it was split on this
point and expressed no opinion as to its justiciable nature.
24 2
In a concurring opinion, Justice Black, joined by Justices
Douglas, Frankfurter, and Roberts, contended that the entire
constitutional amendment process was nonjusticiable.
[t]o the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case
even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of
Congress over submission and ratification of
amendments we are unable to agree .... The Court here
treats the amending process of the Constitution in some
respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as
subject to the final authority of the Congress .... No such
division between the political and judicial branches of the
government is made by Article V which grants power
over the amending of the Constitution to Congress alone.
Undivided control of that process has been given by the
Article exclusively and completely to Congress. The
process itself is 'political' in its entirety, from submission
until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interference at any point.
Congress, possessing exclusive power over the amending
processes, cannot be bound by, and is under no duty to
accept the pronouncements upon that exclusive power by
this Court or by the Kansas courts. Neither state nor
federal courts can review that power. Therefore, any
judicial expression amounting to more than mere
acknowledgement of exclusive Congressional power over
the political process of amendment is mere admonition to
240. Id. at 450.
241. Id. at 454.
242. Id. at 447.
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the Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion, given
wholly without constitutional authority.
243
In the companion case, Chandler v. Wise, 244 Justices Black and
Douglas adhered to their views. 245 The Court, in 1967, again
touched upon the amendment process in Whitehall v. Elkins.
246
The important question which remains is whether Coleman
stands for the proposition that all questions arising out of the
Article V amendment provisions are nonJusticiable political
questions. It has been strongly argued that Coleman does not stand
for absolute nonjusticiability of all questions related to the
amendment process. 247 In Coleman, the Court stressed the fact that
the particular issue it was asked to decide involved determinations
of political, social, and economic conditions which the Court found
Congress to be better equipped to handle. All questions arising out
of Article V, particularly the convention method, will not involve
determinations of these kinds.
248
Since Coleman, the Supreme Court has significantly ex-
pounded upon the concept of the political question. In Baker v.
Carr, 249 the Court held that state legislative reapportionment raised
a justiciable controversy and laid down guidelines on what was
involved in a political question.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments.
2 50
243. Id. at 458-60.
244. 307 U.S. 474(1939).
245. "[Wt le do not believe that state or federal courts have any jurisdiction to interfere with the
amending process." Chandlerv. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 478 (1939) (Black, Douglas,.I., concurring).
246. 389 U.S. 54 (1967). "ITlhe Constitution prescribes the method of 'alteration' by the
amending process in Article V; and while the procedure for amending it is restricted there is no
restraint on the kind of amcndment that may beoffercl." Id. at 57.
247. See Note, 85 HARV. L. RF.v., supra note 16,.at 1636.
218. Id.
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In Powell v. McCormack, 251 the Court held that Congress had no
right to exclude Congressman-elect Adam Clayton Powell from his
seat in the House of Representatives. Powell had requested a
declaratory judgment stating that his exclusion from the House was
unconstitutional, being in violation of Article 1, Section 2 of the
Constitution. The Court held that this presented a justiciable
controversy, stating that "[o]ur system of government requires that
federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at
variance with the construction given the document by another
branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause
cannot justify the court's avoiding of their constitutional
responsibility.' '252
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court stated that one of the
criteria for a political question was a "textually demonstrable
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. ''253
In Coleman, which involved the congressional method of amending
the Constitution, the four concurring Justices stressed the fact that
Article V gives power over the amending process to Congress.
When the Court is faced with a question arising out of the
congressional method of amending, it seems totally appropriate to
treat this as a political nonjusticiable issue. It does not follow,
however, that the convention method of amendment should be
treated likewise. One must keep in mind the purpose behind the
convention method, i.e., a remedy for the possible oppressiveness
of the government. Congress is merely the agency through which
certain acts are performed. It is to perform these acts in a
ministerial and functional way, exercising only minimal discretion.
The convention method is not "committed" to the Congress to the
extent that the congressional method of amending is, and hence, it
should not be treated as giving rise to political, nonjusticiable
questions. Keeping in mind the purpose behind the convention
method, the courts, which are charged with interpreting the
Constitution, 25 4 should not regard the questions arising out of the
convention method as nonjusticiable political ones. 255 It is the
Court's responsibility to insure that this method be kept available
to the states to use, something which would not occur were the
Court to treat Article V convention method issues as nonjusticiable
political questions. Were the Court to treat these issues as political,
249. 392 U.S. 186 (1962), 36.9 U.S. 186(1961).
250. Id. at 217.
251. 395 U.S. 486(1969).
252. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
253. 369 U.S. at 217.
254. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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it would, in effect, be surrendering the convention method to
Congressional control and dominance, clearly hostile and contrary
to the reasons for placing it in the Constitution.
Assuming that the Court would -find Article V convention
issues justiciable, questions arise concerning remedies. The areas
ripe for controversy would include the situation where two-thirds of
the states had arguably submitted valid applications for a
convention to Congress and that body refused to call a convention,
or where the convention adopted amendments on subjects
additional to that placed in the call by Congress or cited by the
states in their applications, and Congress subsequently refused to
transmit such amendments to the states for ratification.
It has been argued by some, on the basis of Marbury v.
Madison,2 56 that a writ of mandamus should issue against the
Congress, compelling action on its part. 257 It is questionable
whether the Court would do this. Standing in its way is the doctrine
of Mississippi v. Johnson.258 In that case, the Court refused to enjoin
President Andrew Johnson from enforcing certain Reconstruction
Acts stating the following:
The Congress is the legislative department of the
government, the President is the executive department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department; though the acts of both, when performed,
are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to
observe that the court is without power to enforce its
process. 259
It has been suggested that this doctrine has since been eroded.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 260 given as an example of such
a case, arose when President Truman issued an executive Order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take control of the nation's
steel mills and operate them in order to avert a nationwide strike.
The district court enjoined the Secretary from continuing
255. Some have argued that the courts should treat questions involving the amendment process
as noniusticiable because many proposed amendments are designed to overturn unpopular Supreme
Court decisions. Bonfield, supra note 60, at 980.
256. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 170, 179-80(1803).
257. Dirksen. supra note 4.
258. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
259. Mississippi v.Johnson. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)475, 500-01 (1866).
260. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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possession of the plants and the Supreme Court affirmed. Another
case mentioned as weakening the doctrine of Mississippi v. Johnson is
Powell v. McCormack,2 61 where the Supreme Court held that the
Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution 262 does not prevent
action by the Court against legislative employees. 263 In Powell the
Court left open the possibility of direct action against Members of
Congress.
264
One can merely speculate as to whether the Supreme Court
would order Congress to call a convention, or submit an Article V
convention's proposals to the states for ratification. If the Court did
issue such a writ against Congress, and Congress refused to
comply, what would, and what could the Court do? Some have
suggested that the Court take charge of the calling and setting up of
the convention, 265 although others have disagreed. 266 Due to the
inability of the Court to fashion effective relief in the event that its
directive against Congress is ignored, several writers have
concluded that the sole remedy should Congress refuse to perform
its duties in regard to the Artice V convention method, lies with the
people. 267
A more probable path to be followed by the Court is that taken
in Powell. Were Congress to refuse to call a convention, or to
submit an Article V convention's proposals to the states for
ratification, it would attempt to justify its actions on the grounds
that the constitutional prerequisites to its duty to call the
convention were not met, or that the convention had exceeded its
constitutional powers. A declaratory judgment by the Supreme
Court to the contrary would certainly undercut Congress'
Justifications and stir public opinion2 68
Precisely what the Supreme Court would do when faced with a
question arising under the Article V convention method is
presently a matter of mere conjecture. Given cases such as Coleman,
Baker, and Powell, there is ample precedent for the Court to go
either direction, i.e.,to find Article V convention issues political
261. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
262. U.S. CONST. art . 1, §6.
263. See alvo Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967): Kilbourn v. Thompson. 103 U.S.
168 (1881"). In both. suiX'were brought against Congressional employees.
264. "Given our disposition of this issue, we need not decide whether under the Speech or
Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to maintain this action so]ll against memrbers of
Congress where no agents participated in the challenged action and no other remedy was available."
395 U.S. at 506 n.26.
265. Carson. supra note 177, at 921.
266. Kauper, supra note 132, at 906.
267. Bonfield, supra note 60, at 983: Wheeler, supra note 71. at 792: Note. 70 HARV. L. Rr.v.,
supra note 74, at 1071.
268. See Note, 85 HARV. L. RFv., supra note 16. at 1644.
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and nonjusticiable, or to go the opposite way. As a matter of
judicial policy, itis hoped that the Court would elect to find Article
V convention method questions justiciable, even though the scope
of its remedial powers raises questions.
269
A final question concerns standing to raise Article V
convention litigation. In Coleman v. Miller, 270 the majority held that
twenty state senators who had voted against ratification of the
proposed Child Labor Amendment had standing to bring suit. The
Court stated as follows:
Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose votes
against ratification have been overridden and virtually
held for naught although if they are right in their
contention their votes would have been sufficient to defeat
ratification. We think that these senators have a plain
direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes.
271
Four Justices dissented on the issue of standing. "No matter how
seriously infringement of the Constitution may be called into
question, this is not- the tribunal for its challenge, except by those
who have some specialized interest of their own to vindicate apart
from a political concern which belongs to all. "272
Under the majority view espoused in Coleman, it would seem
that a proper party to bring suit regarding Article V convention
questions would be, for example, state senators who voted in favor
of an application for an Article V convention, or conceivably, a
member of the Article V convention who voted in favor of the
proposals which Congress refused to transmit to the states for
ratification. Certainly a state which has petitioned for a convention
would have standing. Finding a plaintiff with proper standing to
raise questions concerning the Article V convention method would
seem to raise no great difficulties.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the closing moments of the 1787 convention, Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina remarked, "[clonventions are serious
269. SOe L. ORFTELD. supra note 24. at 7-36: Clark. The Supreme Court and the Amnending Process. 39
VA. L. REV. 621 (1953).
270. 307 U.S. 433(1939).
271. Id. at 438.
272. Id. at 464 (Frankffirt. iJ.. dissenting).
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things and ought not to be repeated." 2731 When there was talk of
having a second constitutional convention, shortly after the
Constitution had been proposed, James Madison aired the
following feelings:
[An Article V Constitutional Convention] would
consequently give greater agitation to the public mind; an
election to it would be courted by the most violent
partisans on both sides; it would probably consist of the
most heterogeneous characters; would be the very focus of
the flame which has already too much heated men of all
parties; would no doubt contain individuals of insidious
views, who under the mask of seeking alterations popular
in some parts, but inadmissible in other parts of the
Union might have a dangerous opportunity of sapping
the very foundations of the fabric, Under all these
circumstances it seems scarcely to be presumable that the
deliberations of the body could be conducted in harmony,
or terminate in the general good. Having witnessed the
difficulties and dangers experienced by the first
convention which assembled under every propitious
circumstahce, I should tremble for the result of a
second .274
That attitude has persevered through the ages. Generally the
prospect of an Article V convention has been ignored, disfavored,
and even feared. 27 5 Over the years there has been much discussion
about Article V's convention method, ranging from wild,
unfounded speculation to serious scholarly debate. It seems
desirable for Congress to settle as many of the issues raised over the
Article V convention method, prior to the actual calling of such a
convention, as it constitutionally can.
In the abstract, scholars can and no doubt will, debate these
issues endlessly. Most of these questions, however, will never be
273. 2 M. FARRAND supra note 27, at 632.
274. Lcttcr of J ames Madison to G. L. Turbrvilc (Novtibi 2, 1788). repruinted in 5 U.S.
BJREAj OF Rot.i.s & LIBRARY, Do':lJMENTARY HISTORY OF rtHE CONSTITtlTION Ot1 THE UNI'Do STATES
OF AMERICA 1786-1870 104-05.
275. A notabhl exception, howcver, was President Lincoln. who preferred the convention
method ofamending the Constitution. In his First Inaugural Address, hi stititi as follows:
Ilhe ( ',,nv tion m simuns lirili'rahh. , in lia it lh5ws aullltlnillls (o
origi nat ( wit 1)hli pcopleh" lhvimsckvcs; n l: fo l ctiligte , lk
ruijcit propisitions iriginimt d hv rihcrs, not cxpc ially hoseni lor Ihc puri sc.
and which migh s. 4no t 1c 81).iscl/suchas hcv w ld with loaw''cp or luse...
S..jour., 36th Cong., Slr(. Sess. 404 (1861).
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resolved until the day that an Article V convention is actually held.
And then, as one writer has observed, "a Convention would be a
new thing and what it would do would depend mostly upon the
men composing it, upon the issues before the people and the
strength of public feeling and opinion at the time. ",
27 6
276. Sprague, supra note 76, at 123.
